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Identity and Federalism: 
Understanding the Implications of 
Daniels v. Canada 
Thomas Isaac and Arend Hoekstra* 
“As the curtain opens wider and wider on the history of Canada’s 
relationship with its Indigenous peoples, inequities are increasingly 
revealed and remedies urgently sought” … “This case represents another 
chapter in the pursuit of reconciliation and redress in that relationship”. 
With these words Justice Abella set the tone of Daniels v. Canada (Indian 
Affairs and Northern Development)1 (“Daniels”); a decision that restates 
settled law, reframes core elements of Indigenous identity, and contributes 
to the recent resetting of the framework for how the federal and provincial 
governments approach reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.  
On its face, Daniels is not so much new law, but rather a restatement 
of the law which raises more questions requiring further judicial 
guidance. The Court declined to make two of the three declarations 
requested by the appellants on the grounds that the law was already clear 
and settled. The remaining issue, a request for a declaration that non-
status Indians and Métis peoples were included in the definition of 
‘Indian’ for the purposes of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867,2 
was only partially contested, with the Crown (as respondent) conceding 
the inclusion of non-status Indians during oral arguments.  
In making the requested declaration, the Court may have intended 
only to clarify and end the “jurisdictional tug-of-war in which [impacted] 
groups were left wondering about where to turn for policy redress”,3 
                                                                                                                       
*  Thomas Isaac is a Partner at Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP, focusing on Aboriginal law. 
Arend Hoekstra is a lawyer with Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP focusing on Government, Aboriginal 
and Mining Law. 
1 [2016] S.C.J. No. 12, 2016 SCC 12, [2016] 1 S.C.R. 99, at para. 1 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Daniels”]. 
2 (U.K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, Appendix II, No. 5 [hereinafter 
“Constitution Act, 1867”]. 
3 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 15. 
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however the Court’s approach in doing so has given rise to new questions 
about the scope and definition of ‘Indigenous peoples’ and the nature and 
purpose of the Crown’s role in reconciliation with Indigenous peoples.  
Daniels will significantly impact the practicalities of reconciliation. The 
Court dismisses any distinction between status and non-status peoples and, 
by implication, raises fundamental questions about Canada’s current 
approach to managing its obligations to Aboriginal peoples (including, as 
set out in the Indian Act4). Daniels is also further evidence that the Court 
no longer prioritizes federal supremacy with regard to section 91(24) and 
interactions with Aboriginal peoples. Along with recent jurisprudence in 
Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources)5 (“Grassy 
Narrows”), Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia6 (“Tsilhqot’in Nation”) 
and Kitkatla Band v. British Columbia (Minister of Small Business, 
Tourism and Culture),7 (“Kitkatla”), Daniels makes clear that principles of 
federalism and reconciliation require the federal and provincial 
governments to act jointly in relation to Indigenous peoples, prompts 
questions as to why the federal government replicates provincial-type 
services exclusively for Inuit and status ‘Indians’ under the Indian Act and 
not for other ‘Indians’ within the meaning of section 91(24), and raises 
questions about the appropriate role of provincial governments when 
considering the needs and rights of Indigenous peoples.  
I. THE DECISION 
In Daniels, the Court was asked to make three declarations: (1) “that 
Métis and non-status Indians are ‘Indians’ under section 91(24), (2) that 
the federal Crown owes a fiduciary duty to Métis and non-status Indians; 
and (3) that Métis and non-status Indians have the right to be consulted 
and negotiated with, in good faith, by the federal government on a 
collective basis through representatives of their choice, respecting all 
their rights, interests and needs as Aboriginal peoples”.8  
Before considering the first declaration, the Court examined whether 
such a declaration would have practical utility in order to “settle a ‘live 
                                                                                                                       
4 R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5 [hereinafter “Indian Act”]. 
5 [2014] S.C.J. No. 48, 2014 SCC 48, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 447 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Grassy 
Narrows”]. 
6 [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, [2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”]. 
7 [2002] S.C.J. No. 33, 2002 SCC 31, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 146 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Kitkatla”]. 
8 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 2. 
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controversy’ between the parties”,9 a criterion in making such a 
declaration. Both federal and provincial governments had denied 
responsibility for Métis and non-status Indians, leaving the affected 
Indigenous groups in a “jurisdictional wasteland with significant and 
obvious disadvantaging consequences”.10 The Court found that a 
declaration would provide practical utility by allowing certainty for 
impacted Indigenous groups, rather than leaving them to “rely more on 
noblesse oblige than on what is obliged by the Constitution”.11  
Given the Crown’s concession that non-status Indians were subject to 
section 91(24), the Court focused its analysis on whether Métis were also 
subject to section 91(24). The Court found evidence that ‘Indians’ had 
“long been used as a general term referring to all Indigenous peoples, 
including mixed ancestry communities”.12 Before and after confederation 
the government frequently classified Aboriginal peoples with mixed-
ancestry peoples, and would routinely include Métis communities in 
treaties.13 Perhaps most striking, the trial judge found that the Constitution 
Act, 1867 was drafted with the intention of constructing a railway across 
Canada, and as a consequence, the federal government was given powers to 
manage western communities of Aboriginal peoples and Métis and to 
address any resistance they might incite against a railway.14 
While Métis do not identify as ‘Indians’, they possess distinct cultures, 
and are a distinct Aboriginal peoples.15 This does not preclude them from 
inclusion under section 91(24). In Reference re: British North America Act, 
1867 (U.K.), s. 9116 (“Re Eskimo”) the Court found that “while the Inuit 
[similarly] had their own language, culture and identities separate from that 
of the ‘Indian Tribes’ ... they were ‘Indians’ under s. 91(24)”.17 
Similarly, mixed-ancestry does not preclude such persons from 
inclusion within section 91(24), as the Court’s determination in Attorney 
General of Canada v. Canard18 “shows that intermarriage and mixed-
                                                                                                                       
9 Id., at para. 11. 
10 Id., at para. 14. 
11 Id., at para. 12. 
12 Id., at para. 23. 
13 Id., at para. 24. 
14 Id., at para. 25. 
15 A Matter of National and Constitutional Import: Report of the Minister’s Special 
Representative on Reconciliation within Métis: Section 35 Métis Rights and the Manitoba Métis 
Federation Decision, at 6, online: <https://www.aadnc-aandc.gc.ca/DAM/DAM-INTER-HQ-
AI/STAGING/texte-text/report_reconciliation_1471371154433_eng.pdf> [hereinafter “Métis MSR”]. 
16 [1939] S.C.J. No. 5, [1939] S.C.R. 104 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Re Eskimo”]. 
17 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 39. 
18 [1975] S.C.J. No. 26, [1976] 1 S.C.R. 170 (S.C.C.). 
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ancestry do not prelude groups from inclusion under s. 91(24)”.19 To be 
clear, while the Court refers to ‘mixed-ancestry’ throughout Daniels, we 
know from the Court’s earlier decision in R. v. Powley,20 (“Powley”) and 
others, that mixed-ancestry, by itself, is only one attribute of making up 
the distinct nature of Métis peoples under section 35. 
Despite the lack of “consensus on who is considered Métis or a non-
status Indian”,21 the Court found that “historical, philosophical, and 
linguistic context establish that ‘Indians’ in s. 91(24) includes all 
Aboriginal peoples, including non-status Indians and Métis”.22 
For the purpose of determining whether a Métis individual is subject 
to section 91(24), the Court determined that only the first two parts of the 
Powley23 test are relevant, specifically, that: (1) the individual self-
identify as Métis, and (2) they have an ancestral connection to an historic 
Métis community.24 The third criterion, that the individual be accepted by 
a community, was rejected as it risked excluding those who were no 
longer accepted by their community.25  
Having concluded that ‘Indian’ in section 91(24) is a broad term 
which includes Métis and non-status Indians, the Court noted that 
‘Indians’ for the purpose of section 91(24) is different than the use of 
‘Indian’ in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 198226 which refers instead 
to ‘Indian bands’,27 meaning First Nations. 
Having determined that the first declaration should be granted, the 
Court considered the second: that the Crown owes a fiduciary duty to 
Métis and non-status Indians. The Court identified Delgamuukw v. 
British Columbia28 as already defining the fiduciary duty of the Crown, 
and Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General)29 as 
supporting the extension of the fiduciary duty to Métis. As a 
consequence, the Court rejected the second declaration on the basis that 
it restated settled law.30  
                                                                                                                       
19 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 41. 
20 [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, 2003 SCC 43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 2007 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Powley”]. 
21 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 17. 
22 Id., at para. 19. 
23 Powley, supra, note 20. 
24 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 48. 
25 Id., at para. 49. 
26 Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. 
27 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 35. 
28 [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (S.C.C.). 
29 [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.). 
30 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 53. 
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The third declaration sought, that Métis and non-status Indians have 
the right to be consulted and negotiated with, in good faith, by the federal 
government, on a collective basis,31 was also rejected, as it was already 
addressed in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests)32,33 
(“Haida Nation”). 
1. Findings of the Court 
The findings of the Court were not unexpected. While the Court did 
not deliberate on the inclusion of non-status Indians in section 91(24) as 
it was conceded by Canada, it was nearly certain that the outcome would 
reflect the principle of constitutional supremacy. The determination of 
‘status’ is governed by the Indian Act, a federal legislative creation 
flowing from Parliament’s authority under the Constitution Act, 1867, 
and unlikely to govern the interpretation of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
With regard to the inclusion of Métis, the Court’s decision was almost 
assured given the historical reality of the Métis, the Métis’ inclusion in 
some treaties and the judicial precedent of the Inuit being included 
within the term ‘Indian’ in Re Eskimo. Though interpreted separately, for 
practical purposes the Court was also likely to include in section 91(24) 
the same Indigenous peoples listed in section 35; providing the same 
rights to Aboriginal peoples, but different methods of obtaining and 
practising those rights would have certainly created disparity of 
circumstance between Aboriginal peoples, increased the challenge of 
reconciliation, created unnecessary redundancies, and made it more 
challenging for Aboriginal peoples to exercise their section 35 rights.  
The Court was similarly cautious when rejecting the second and third 
declarations. Not only were both these declarations unnecessary as they 
were addressed by settled law, the declarations were fundamentally related 
to section 35 rights rather than section 91(24); any potential conflation of 
these constitutional provisions could impact the expectations of Indigenous 
peoples (including Aboriginal peoples) and the Crown, potentially 
impeding reconciliation.  
                                                                                                                       
31  The Court did not specifically address the assertion that there is an obligation to negotiate,  
in good faith. Such an assertion was not clearly made in Haida Nation. It will be interesting to see 
whether the Court asserts the existence of this duty in the future.  
32 [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 2004 SCC 73, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida 
Nation”]. 
33 In Haida Nation, the Court determined that to fulfil the honour of the Crown, the Crown 
must consult with, and where appropriate, accommodate Aboriginal peoples whenever Crown action 
could adversely impact Aboriginal or treaty rights.  
32 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
2. Indigenous Roots 
One of the most striking aspects of Daniels is not the conclusion of the 
Court, but rather the words the Court employed in reaching its conclusion. 
While the Court’s prior use of the term ‘indigenous’ was sparse, Daniels 
represents the first material use of the term, core to the central analysis and 
reasoning set out in Daniels. The Court used the noun ‘Indigenous’ five 
times in Daniels.34 Prior to Daniels, the Court has only used the term 
‘indigenous’ in an Aboriginal law context eight other times, and each time 
as an adjective (as in ‘indigenous groups’) rather than a proper noun.35  
The Court has increasingly used the adjective ‘indigenous’ in recent 
years: it was used first in 1973 in Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General),36 used sparingly in the 1990s and early 2000s, before being 
employed five times in Tsilhqot’in Nation. 
The Court’s use of the noun ‘Indigenous’ in Daniels is likely 
purposeful. Not only is it used as a proper noun for the first time by the 
Court, it is employed from the opening sentence, drawing attention to the 
‘inequities’ suffered by Indigenous peoples, and the need for redress.37  
(a) What’s in a Name? 
The term ‘Indigenous’ in Daniels is used in such diverse settings as to 
allow for a general definition to be construed. The Court’s use of 
‘Indigenous’ is broad. Three of the five times it is used, ‘Indigenous’ is 
prefaced by ‘all’, suggesting that it is intended as a general, rather than a 
specific classification. This general category of ‘Indigenous’ peoples 
includes First Nations, Inuit, non-status Indians, Métis and what the 
Court refers to as ‘mixed-ancestry’ communities: 
‘Indians’ has long been used as a general term referring to all Indigenous 
peoples, including mixed-ancestry communities like the Métis. The term 
                                                                                                                       
34 Daniels, supra, note 1, at paras. 1, 6, 9, 14, 23. 
35 See Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, 2001 SCC 
33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911 (S.C.C.); R. v. Marshall, [2005] S.C.J. No. 44, 2005 SCC 43, [2005] 2 
S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.); Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44, 
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 256 (S.C.C.); R. v. Côté, [1996] S.C.J. No. 93, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Van der Peet, [1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 (S.C.C.); R. v. Kapp, [2008] S.C.J. No. 42, 
2008 SCC 41, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 483 (S.C.C.); Calder v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] 
S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313, 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145 (S.C.C.); Manitoba Métis Federation Inc. v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.). 
36 Id.  
37 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 1. 
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was created by European settlers and applied to Canada’s Aboriginal 
peoples without making any distinction between them.38  
In referring to the trial judge’s conclusion, the Court also framed 
‘Indigenous’ as including non-status Indians and Métis when it stated 
that “‘Indians’ under s. 91(24) is a broad term referring to all Indigenous 
peoples in Canada, including non-status Indians and Métis”. While the 
Court frames this statement as simply a paraphrasing of the Federal 
Court, the trial decision never employed ‘Indigenous’ as a proper noun or 
in describing a broader classification of peoples.  
Despite these uses, there remains some uncertainty with regard to the 
meaning of ‘Indigenous’. The trial judge’s restated determination, above, 
would limit ‘Indigenous’ to only section 35 Aboriginal peoples, however 
the Court never makes this statement on its own behalf, leaving the door 
open to the possibility that ‘Indigenous’ includes other peoples in 
addition to those included in section 35. Indeed, the Court’s use of 
‘Indigenous’ is entirely expansive: while being clear that ‘Indigenous’ 
means Indians (including non-status Indians), Métis, Inuit, and ‘mixed-
ancestry’, at no point does the Court limit inclusion in the term.  
One potential area for expansion in the scope of the category of 
‘Indigenous’ beyond Aboriginal peoples for the purposes of section 35 is 
in the definition of Métis. While the Court requires that Métis individuals 
subject to section 91(24) meet a modified Powley test, the amended test 
has the potential of significantly expanding those defined as Métis for the 
purposes of section 91(24) as opposed to section 35.  
It is also likely that ‘Indigenous’, as used in Daniels, includes peoples 
who consider themselves to be of ‘mixed-ancestry’ or individuals who 
have ancestral connections to the communities included in section 91(24) 
but who do not identify themselves with any particular community. 
Finally, there is a possibility that, as will be discussed later, 
‘Indigenous’ is a category which includes not only section 91(24) 
peoples, but also encompasses all peoples who have an ancestral 
connection to Indigenous communities and even those who, without 
definitive evidence, self-identify as ‘Indigenous’. 
(b) Purpose of ‘Indigenous’ 
In addition to uncertainty over the scope of ‘Indigenous’ as a 
category, the Court’s purpose in employing the term also remains 
                                                                                                                       
38 Id., at para. 23. 
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unclear. As will be discussed later, ‘Indigenous’ has a meaning within the 
framework of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples39 (“UNDRIP”), potentially leaving the door open to 
some form of reconciliation between existing Canadian law and future 
implementation of UNDRIP.  
The Court may have intended to introduce the term ‘Indigenous’ as a 
larger and more flexible category than Aboriginal peoples, which would 
encompass all section 91(24) individuals. The Court has traditionally used 
‘Aboriginal peoples’ as a synonym for those individuals endowed with 
section 35 rights, a definition that is construed from the text of section 35(2) 
of the Constitution Act, 1982. With its conclusion in Daniels, the Court 
identified a distinct and broader category of Indigenous peoples who are 
subject to section 91(24). Since section 91(24) peoples include all 
Aboriginal peoples, a definition for section 91(24) peoples would have 
naturally worked as a general and broader category to encompass all 
constitutionally included peoples. This approach was foiled however, as 
section 91(24) already comes with a definition for this larger category: 
‘Indian’. The Court’s recognition that ‘Indian’ already has a distinct and 
much more narrow definition under section 35 may also be an 
acknowledgement that a larger definition is necessary. The Court may have 
addressed this problem by employing the noun ‘Indigenous’.  
It is also possible that ‘Indigenous’ is indeed broader still, 
encompassing both constitutionally included Aboriginal peoples and 
others. Such a definition would have a limited legal purpose, but would 
be a practical tool of the Court. The categories of peoples included in 
section 35 and section 91(24) will necessarily have limits, and at some 
point, the Court will need to determine whether someone is or is not 
‘Aboriginal’ or ‘Indian’ within the meaning of section 91(24). Using the 
term ‘Indigenous’ may be a way of respecting an individual’s or a 
community’s identity despite excluding them from constitutionally 
defined categories. This potential use of ‘Indigenous’ would be 
consistent with the Court’s emphasis on “the pursuit of reconciliation and 
redress”40 in the relationship between Canada and its Indigenous peoples, 
albeit with a likely consequence of causing greater uncertainty and 
confusion, and raising more questions around Indigenous identity and its 
meaning from a legal and policy perspective.  
                                                                                                                       
39 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: resolution adopted by the 
General Assembly, A/RES/61/295, UNGAOR, 61st Sess. (2007), online: United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees <http://www.refworld.org/docid/471355a82.html> [hereinafter “UNDRIP”]. 
40 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 1. 
(2017) 81 S.C.L.R. (2d) IDENTITY AND FEDERALISM 35 
Finally, the distribution of ‘Indigenous’ throughout Daniels may 
provide insights into its intended meaning. ‘Indigenous’ appears 
predominantly at the beginning of Daniels, with three-fifths of its 
occurrence within the first 16 per cent of the text, four-fifths occurring in 
the first quarter of the text, and no instance of ‘Indigenous’ appearing in 
the second half of Daniels.41 This distribution suggests that the Court 
may not have intended for the term ‘Indigenous’ to be legally significant, 
but instead to act as a term of convenience. Once the Court advanced its 
discussion and began to examine specific classes of Indigenous peoples 
for the purpose of section 91(24) including Métis and non-status Indians, 
the Court ceased to use ‘Indigenous’ as a noun or an adjective. The 
Court’s restraint from using ‘Indigenous’ within its conclusions and 
much of its analysis somewhat undermines the proposition that the Court 
intended for ‘Indigenous’ to have a legally significant meaning and 
instead lends credence to the proposition that ‘Indigenous’ is used as a 
category of convenience. ‘Indigenous’ may not be the only category of 
convenience employed by the Court; the Court’s statement that “‘Métis’ 
can ... be used as a general term for anyone with mixed European and 
Aboriginal heritage”, when discussing peoples included in section 91(24), 
appears to create an alternative definition of ‘Métis’ that differs from the 
Court’s earlier guidance that Métis under section 35 are distinct 
Aboriginal peoples not defined solely by their mixed-ancestry.42  
The resulting challenge is that without express guidance from the Court, 
readers of Daniels are left with a spectrum of alternatives, both to the 
meaning of the term ‘Indigenous’, and to the purposes for which the Court 
intends ‘Indigenous’ to be used. This is not a particularly helpful proposition 
given the dynamic state of Aboriginal relations in Canada today. 
(c) Continuing Questions re ‘Indigenous’ 
With regard to the category ‘Indigenous’, as discussed, Daniels raises 
more questions than it addresses. As set out below, the first and  
most relevant question for those looking to use the term ‘Indigenous’,  
is whether it is intended only to include those peoples subject to  
section 91(24) (including, necessarily those peoples subject to section 35), 
or whether others may be included? Similarly, does the Court intend for 
                                                                                                                       
41 Calculations made on the basis of paragraphs within Daniels. Occurrences of 
‘Indigenous’ were at paras. 1, 6, 9, 14, and 23. 
42 Métis MSR, supra, note 15, at p. 15. 
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‘Indigenous’ to be a legally determinable category, or is it instead 
intended as an entirely subjective category whereby anyone can identify 
as ‘Indigenous’? Finally, what is the legal purpose of ‘Indigenous’, if 
any? Is ‘Indigenous’ only a category of convenience, or does it have 
implications within the broader framework of reconciliation and the 
honour of the Crown? 
3. An All-Inclusive Category 
Concerns about the scope of ‘Indigenous’ would become redundant if 
section 91(24) itself acted as a broad, wholly encompassing definition  
for Indigenous peoples. The Court in Daniels leaves this as a distinct 
possibility.  
By constricting the Powley test, the Court expands the inclusion of 
Métis for the purposes of section 91(24). The test as set out in Powley 
and summarized in Daniels “for defining who qualifies as Métis for the 
purposes of s. 35(1) [is]: 
1. Self-identification as a Métis; 
2. An ancestral connection to an historic Métis community; and 
3. Acceptance by the modern Métis community.”43  
Since section 91(24) is “about the federal government’s relationship 
with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples”,44 including “people who may no 
longer be accepted by their communities”,45 the Court found that the 
third step of the Powley test should be eliminated when concluding on 
inclusion as Métis under section 91(24).  
On its face, the restriction of the Powley test does appear to only 
impact those who are alienated by their community, but Part Three, as set 
out in Powley also includes a requirement that “the modern community 
[have] continuity with the historic community”.46 The result is to do 
away with community-based rights and identity47 and move towards a 
framework based solely on ancestral connection (be it by “birth, 
adoption, or other means”48). This is a material alteration of the definition 
                                                                                                                       
43 Id., at para. 48. 
44 Id., at para. 49. 
45 Id. 
46 Powley, supra, note 20, at para. 33. 
47 Id., at para. 22. 
48 Id., at para. 32. 
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of Métis, not only because it may significantly increase those included in 
the category, but also because it may become significantly more difficult to 
establish or dismiss claims of inclusion. Finally, though unchanged from 
Powley, the availability of ‘other means’ by which ancestry can be 
demonstrated, in tandem with eliminating a requirement for continuity with 
a historic community, creates the possibility of additional difficult-to-
disprove claims of Métis identity and the potential for a significant 
expansion of the category of Métis. This definition of Métis appears to run 
counter to the definition in Powley where it was noted that Métis are not all 
mixed-ancestry peoples, but rather peoples who have, in addition to their 
mixed ancestry, “developed their own customs, way of life, and 
recognizable group identity separate from their Indian or Inuit and 
European forebears”,49 and has the potential of materially expanding the 
number of individuals included under the term ‘Métis.’ 
The Court’s inclusion of non-status Indians in section 91(24) was also 
determined with what appears to be little concern for the potential 
breadth of eligible participants. The Court recognized that the term ‘non-
status Indian’ was imprecise as it “can refer to Indians who no longer 
have status under the Indian Act, or to members of mixed communities 
who have never been recognized as Indians by the federal government”.50 
The Court’s reference to ‘mixed communities’ suggests that there could 
be non-Métis, non-section 35 Indian individuals who are included in 
section 91(24). The phrase ‘mixed communities’ rather than ‘mixed 
ancestry communities’, may also signify that the Court is less concerned 
about cultural or historic elements of Indigenous identity. The Court 
expressly states that the term ‘Indians’ as used in section 91(24), has 
been associated with “all Indigenous peoples, including mixed-ancestry 
communities like the Métis”.51 The Court’s phrasing leads by necessity to 
the conclusion that other mixed-ancestry communities who do not 
qualify as Métis under the abbreviated Powley test may still fall under 
section 91(24).  
In setting the scope for section 91(24), the Court appears to show 
little concern for imprecise categories, finding that “there is no consensus 
on who is considered Métis or a non-status Indian, nor need there be”.52 
Again, this appears to contradict, at least for the purposes of section 35, 
the Court’s previous findings that Métis peoples are distinct Aboriginal 
                                                                                                                       
49 Powley, supra, note 20, at para. 10. 
50 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 18. 
51 Id., at para. 23 (emphasis added). 
52 Id., at para. 17. 
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peoples with distinct cultures and traditions. Beyond imprecision, the 
Court’s actions also appear to embrace general uncertainty; both the 
expanded definition of Métis and the flexible approach to determining 
Indians for the purposes of section 91(24) are likely to result in scenarios 
where proving eligibility is difficult or impossible. Like the use of 
‘Indigenous’, the Court does not explain the scope of section 91(24). 
(a) What Does it Mean? 
Based on the overall tone and structure of Daniels, it is arguable that 
the Court has intentionally placed minimal restrictions on the scope of  
section 91(24). Since section 91(24) is not a rights-bearing provision, the 
Court may perceive it instead to be a practical tool for reconciliation. By 
explicitly confirming that section 91(24) does not create a duty to 
legislate,53 the Court was left with two potential applications for the 
provision: (i) ensuring that the rights of section 35 Aboriginal peoples are 
appropriately protected and addressed, and (ii) furthering reconciliation. 
The Court’s frequent reference to past injustices, including the operations 
and legacy of residential schools,54 may suggest one objective of a broad 
definition: ensuring that all individuals harmed by the actions of the Crown 
as a consequence of their identity as or their ancestors’ affiliation with 
Indigenous peoples can seek redress from the federal government. This 
suggestion lends support for the abbreviation of the Powley test and the 
inclusion of individuals not otherwise affiliated with an Indigenous 
community: while Aboriginal rights are typically held and exercised 
collectively,55 Canada’s legacy with Indigenous peoples has often resulted 
in harm to individuals.  
This broad definition of section 91(24) may therefore serve as an 
envelope with which to aggregate all those who seek reconciliation with 
the Crown for reasons associated with their Indigenous heritage, without 
requiring proof of Aboriginal rights, which may be both impossible and 
irrelevant to the objective of redress. Unfortunately, the use of the term 
‘Métis’ as referring to both Métis section 35 rights-bearing peoples and 
other ‘Métis’ under section 91(24) only adds to the confusion and may 
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fundamentally contradict the Court’s earlier findings and reasoning on 
why Métis peoples are a distinct Aboriginal peoples in Canada. 
4. Future Implications — UNDRIP 
The most apparent implication of Daniels, besides providing certainty for 
Indigenous peoples, is the importation of the term ‘indigenous’ into 
Canadian law. The Court’s increasing use of the term and its prominent 
employment in Daniels, during a time when speculation of how Canada will 
implement UNDRIP had returned to the news cycle,56 may feed speculation 
that the Court is anticipating UNDRIP’s adoption into Canadian law.  
UNDRIP was endorsed by Canada in 2010 but has not been ratified 
into domestic legislation.57 UNDRIP is a blunt tool not easily connected 
to Canada’s existing, sophisticated and rapidly developing section 35 
legal framework for recognizing and protecting Aboriginal and treaty 
rights. It is not clear how UNDRIP could be incorporated into Canadian 
law without significantly altering the existing law relating to Canada’s 
Indigenous peoples, as it includes the requirement to obtain “free, prior 
and informed consent before adopting and implementing legislative or 
administrative measures that may impact [Indigenous peoples]”58 as well 
as a stipulation that “indigenous peoples have the right to the lands, 
territories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied 
or otherwise acquired”.59 These broad provisions carry the potential of 
significantly altering existing rules around rights recognition and 
consultation set out in Haida Nation and Aboriginal title, as recently 
discussed in Tsilhqot’in Nation.  
The Court’s use of the term ‘Indigenous’ appears to have a 
fundamentally different purpose than the use of the word ‘Indigenous’ in 
UNDRIP. Daniels employs ‘Indigenous’ as a broad term which is likely 
synonymous, or potentially broader than, the category described in 
section 91(24). The overall use of ‘Indigenous’ within Daniels appears as 
a way of framing both section 35 rights-holding Indigenous peoples and 
non-section 35 rights-holding Indigenous peoples. The term ‘Indigenous’ 
in UNDRIP is used primarily as a way of identifying rights-holders.  
                                                                                                                       
56 “Canada and UNDRIP: Q&A with Minister Bennett’s Office”, online: (2016) Northern 
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57 Thomas Isaac, Aboriginal Law, 5th ed. (Toronto: Thomson Reuters, 2016), at p. 62. 
58 UNDRIP, supra, note 39, at Article 19. 
59 Id., at Article 26.1. 
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In many ways, UNDRIP is inconsistent60 with current Canadian 
jurisprudence; to apply UNDRIP to all ‘Indigenous’ peoples would add to 
this inconsistency. For example, on its face, the duty to consult under 
UNDRIP is broader, though lacking any legal context, than that elucidated 
in Haida Nation, and expanded upon in other Court decisions,61 which 
provide a spectrum of obligations for consultation, but which, where rights 
are unproven, is unlikely to require consent from the impacted Aboriginal 
Peoples.62 Similarly, UNDRIP’s stipulation that lands be returned to 
Indigenous peoples, with no other material legal context, is inconsistent 
with Canada’s relatively sophisticated existing legal framework on these 
matters and case law relating to Aboriginal title.63,64  
On its face, the term ‘Indigenous’ appears to have been used without 
consideration of UNDRIP. If UNDRIP is ever incorporated into 
Canadian law, the use of ‘Indigenous’ in Daniels could be applied as a 
tool of interpretation, which would likely result in outcomes not 
anticipated or intended by the Court or governments.  
5. Future Implications — Reconciliation 
Perhaps the most interesting implication of Daniels is its meaning for 
reconciliation. The Court in Daniels framed its decision around 
reconciliation stating that “this case represents another chapter in the 
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ch. 2 at 2§1090 (Proview). 
64 In Tsilhqot’in Nation, the Court found that Aboriginal title could be infringed for a 
variety of reasons, including many of the current uses of Canadian land today, such as “the 
development of agriculture, forestry, mining, and hydroelectric power, the general economic 
development of the interior of British Columbia, protection of the environment or endangered 
species, the building of infrastructure and the settlement of foreign populations to support those 
aims” [Tsilhqot’in Nation, supra, note 6, at para. 83].  
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pursuit of reconciliation and redress in that relationship”,65 but 
interestingly, the ‘reconciliation’, as framed by the Court is between 
Canada and its Indigenous peoples.66 Until now, the Court has framed 
reconciliation in relation to section 35.67 That framing made sense: 
“aboriginals lived on the land in distinct societies, with their own 
practices, traditions and cultures”68 before the imposition of the 
sovereignty of the Crown. Consequently, in order to respect this prior 
existence, the Crown must limit its activities where they would impact 
the “practices, traditions and customs central to the Aboriginal societies 
that existed in North America prior to contact with Europeans”.69  
(a) What is Section 91(24) Reconciliation? 
Daniels expands reconciliation beyond its previous focus on section 35 
rights. By explicitly expanding section 91(24) beyond the scope of 
section 35 rights-holders, the Court has created a category of non-section 35 
rights-holders for whom the federal Crown may legislate and infers 
potential obligations by stating that the purpose of the declaration is to 
provide clarity for section 91(24) peoples looking for redress.70  
Reconciliation appears to be different for the purposes of section 91(24) 
than for the purposes of section 35. First, section 35 requires a 
reconciliation of Aboriginal peoples with the Crown. This reconciliation 
recognizes that Aboriginal and treaty rights are held by Aboriginal 
communities,71 and that reconciliation involves maintaining a framework 
in which separate systems and cultures can co-exist.72 Daniels, however, 
expands section 91(24) to include individuals who are not associated with 
a community.73 Section 35 reconciliation is not possible between the 
Crown and individuals: practically, the Crown cannot accommodate an 
indeterminate number of individuals with individually unique rights; 
consultation, a hallmark of reconciliation, is not possible as a duty owed to 
individuals; and it would be challenging for individuals to assert unique 
                                                                                                                       
65 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 1. 
66 Id. 
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70 Daniels, supra, note 1, at para. 15. 
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rights or surrender rights in a meaningful way, particularly given that 
section 35 rights are collective in nature.  
Second, ‘redress’, as used by the Court in Daniels, does not appear to 
refer to Aboriginal rights. Aboriginal rights require reconciliation because 
they not only existed, but will continue to exist, conceivable for so long as 
the Crown exercises sovereignty. ‘Redress’ alternatively is a backwards-
looking noun meaning to seek relief or a remedy.74 ‘Redress’ therefore must 
have been triggered by an historic wrong, and must be remediable through 
an action in the present. Such wrongs likely include the residential school 
system which, as noted previously, the Court refers to repeatedly in Daniels.  
Finally, the Court’s use of the term ‘policy redress’75 may distinguish 
section 91(24) from the legal redress framework in section 35. ‘Policy 
redress’, as compared with legal redress, may imply the desire for 
dialogue between Indigenous peoples and the federal government, 
sensitive to a spectrum of competing needs and interests, without the 
imposition of strict legal obligations on the federal government and 
without fettering the ability of provincial governments to govern. 
It appears that reconciliation for the purposes of section 91(24) does not 
mean a requirement for the Crown to navigate and accommodate new or 
existing rights. Not only does the Court’s language not support this assertion, 
the inclusion of individuals would make such accommodation 
unmanageable. Neither does section 91(24) imply new obligations of the 
Crown going forward, for the same reasons. Instead, ‘reconciliation’ for the 
purposes of section 91(24) appears to be focused on the federal Crown 
remedying historic wrongs that it has committed against Indigenous peoples, 
including individuals, whether or not they are section 35 Aboriginal peoples.  
(b) What are the Obligations of Section 91(24)? 
The focus of section 91(24) may be the reconciliation of individuals 
harmed by the Crown as a result of being Indigenous peoples, however 
the Crown’s responsibilities with regards to section 91(24) peoples 
remain unclear.  
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(i) Alternative — Moral Obligation 
The Court’s oft reference to residential schools in Daniels suggests 
that the Court is concerned with the Crown’s moral obligation to provide 
remedies for those who have been injured by its historic acts. Though 
Indigenous peoples have the same rights of action against the Crown, it 
may be morally objectionable that each should be required to endure the 
cost, emotional pain, and time associated with such a claim, especially 
given the advanced age of many survivors. Consequently, the declaration of 
a moral obligation would be meaningful to affected Indigenous peoples.  
It is possible that the Court only intends for section 91(24) to make 
clear the moral obligations of the Crown to remedy historic wrongs 
against Indigenous peoples, and address their present implications. The 
Court cited the observation of the trial judge that Indigenous peoples “are 
deprived of programs, services and intangible benefits recognized by all 
governments as needed”,76 suggesting that the federal government was 
aware of these needs, but avoided moral responsibility by contesting that 
jurisdiction was held by the provinces. Since the effects of historic 
wrongs are often disparate and broad, and the current implications may 
be challenging to address, the Court may recognize that it is not equipped 
to evaluate and determine optimal forms of redress and assistance. By 
instead making it clear that the federal government is responsible for 
addressing historic wrongs and its present implications, the Court 
provides clarity on Canada’s moral obligations, and allows the legislature 
(being subject to public pressure) to provide meaningful redress and 
present implications.  
If the intention of section 91(24) ‘redress’ is only to highlight the 
Crown’s moral obligations to Indigenous peoples, it is also implied that 
the Crown’s obligations to such peoples are limited temporally. Since the 
moral obligation is only triggered where the Crown acts in such a way 
that requires redress (conceivably on a scale that triggers public moral 
concern), the Crown’s obligations to section 91(24) Indigenous peoples 
would conclude once reasonable redress was provided. This is not 
inconsistent with the Court’s general tone in Daniels: if the purpose is 
redress, then it is conceivable that such a purpose could be fulfilled.  
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(ii) Alternative — General Obligation  
Instead of asserting only a moral obligation, the Court could be 
suggesting that while historic wrongs resulted in the need for redress, 
such redress should be focused on addressing inequality instead of 
specific harm. Inequality and specific harm may be connected, having 
been the result of the same misconduct, but a focus on general inequality 
rather than specific redress will have drastically different consequences. 
The Court has noted, as previously identified, that some Indigenous 
peoples “are deprived of programs, services and intangible benefits”.77 
This language is significantly broader than ‘redress’, used elsewhere, and 
seems inconsistent with some aspects of Daniels. For instance, it is 
unclear how additional programming and services could effectively 
target those not associated with an Indigenous community. Similarly, 
how can an obligation to address inequality survive the Court’s assertion 
that there is no “duty to legislate”?78  
More significantly, if the objective of section 91(24) goes beyond 
specific and individual redress, and instead considers broader more fluid 
concepts like inequality, the obligations on the federal government  
may continue indefinitely. Though not unreasonable given the 
intergenerational legacy of Canada’s historic misdeeds towards 
Indigenous peoples,79 a broader obligation on the Crown to address 
systemic inequality would likely require significant and ongoing efforts 
which in practice may be consistent with the Crown’s existing practices 
with Aboriginal peoples.  
Reconciliation that focused on the general well-being of Indigenous 
peoples would, necessarily, be less focused on individual harm 
committed, which sits in contrast to the Courts concern for individuals 
who are disassociated from their traditional communities and who have 
fallen through the cracks. Addressing economic disparity would require a 
focus on education and economic empowerment, activities which may 
benefit Indigenous communities, but which would likely omit 
disassociated Indigenous peoples. Such a result does not seem consistent 
with the purposes and perspectives applied in Daniels. 
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(c) Conclusions on Reconciliation 
While the Court in Daniels refers to reconciliation, it does not 
explicitly state what section 91(24) reconciliation comprises and what 
obligations the Crown has in furthering section 91(24) reconciliation. 
The Court’s stated aim of clarifying where Indigenous peoples should 
turn for redress is countered by its assertion that the federal government 
does not have an obligation to legislate. The resulting stalemate suggests 
that given the complexity of section 91(24), partially created by the 
broad scope for inclusion of individuals therein, the Court has no 
intention to dictate the appropriate framework for redress and 
reconciliation. Rather, it appears that the Court has clarified the 
obligations of the federal government and will allow the political process 
to find a resolution, at least for now.  
While it may be possible that the Court intends for section 91(24) to 
address broader inequalities, this is not supported by the text in Daniels. 
While calls for greater funding are a natural outcome of Daniels and would 
be helpful for reconciliation generally, the Court’s desired approach seems 
to be more nuanced given its concern for Indigenous peoples who are 
otherwise unaffiliated with existing Indigenous communities.  
6. Provinces, Aboriginal Peoples and Federalism 
During a conference in late 2016, one of the authors overheard a 
provincial representative state that the Canadian provinces were the 
‘winners’ in Daniels. Such views of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ as between the 
provinces and the federal government represent an impoverished view  
of section 35, reconciliation, the honour of the Crown, and more 
fundamentally, the legal underpinnings of the Canadian federation. 
Following the release of Daniels, many argued that funding for Métis 
communities was likely to increase, with one representative commentator 
noting that “the federal government will [now] have to justify any 
distinction in the type and level of services it provides to status Indians, 
non-status Indians and Métis”.80 This position is not unreasonable. 
Pursuant to the Indian Act, the federal government has maintained a 
register of First Nations people who qualify as status Indians. Despite 
lacking a foundation in section 35, this register has been a primary factor 
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in determining federal funding allocations. At present, status Indians 
have turned to the federal government for education and healthcare 
programs, while non-status and Métis have instead been served, in 
varying degrees and in some cases with uncertainty, by the provinces.  
In Daniels, the Court exposed this dichotomy of treatment between 
status Indians and other Aboriginal peoples as constitutionally unfounded. 
If, as Daniels asserts, section 91(24) includes all Indians, Inuit and Métis, 
why has the federal government, when acting pursuant to the authority 
granted to it in section 91(24), distinguished between section 35 Aboriginal 
peoples when deciding whether to provide services and other support?  
On its face, Daniels suggests that the federal government will need to 
justify any disparity in the allocation of funding and benefits between 
status Indians and other section 35 rights holders.81 Given that the federal 
government currently provides provincial-type services to status Indians 
and Inuit, some have interpreted Daniels to mean that the federal 
government must now take over the provision of services to all Indigenous 
peoples. However, this interpretation relies on an assumption about the 
federal government’s obligations to Indigenous peoples which is not 
supported by Daniels. 
(a) Declaration Federal and Provincial Governments’ Obligations 
Come From Section 35, not Section 91(24) 
The federal government’s obligations to Aboriginal peoples are set 
out in section 35. Section 35 extends to all Aboriginal peoples meeting 
the test for possessing such rights (as set out in Van der Peet and 
Powley82), whether status or non-status, as well as to Inuit and Métis 
peoples. However, these section 35 obligations are not exclusive to the 
federal governments as section 35 “applies to both provinces and the 
federal government”.83 
The nature of the relationship between the federal government and 
Indigenous peoples is distinguished from the relationship between the 
provinces and Indigenous peoples by reason only of section 91(24). 
However, section 91(24) does not create obligations to Indigenous 
peoples in the way that section 35 creates obligations on the Crown to 
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Aboriginal peoples. Section 91(24) has an altogether different purpose. 
Since it contains no duty to legislate,84 section 91(24) is not a source of 
rights for Indigenous peoples, and instead “is about the federal 
government’s relationship with Canada’s Aboriginal peoples”.85 As 
suggested earlier, the nature of any obligation which flows to the federal 
government as a consequence of section 91(24) is unclear, and may be 
focused on a moral duty in lieu of a legislative duty.  
(b) Section 91(24) does not Significantly Constrain the Provinces  
From Acting 
In Daniels, the Court explicitly stated that “federal authority under 
section 91(24) does not bar valid provincial schemes that do not impair 
the core of the Indian power”86 and that it will “favour, where possible, 
the ordinary operation of statutes enacted by both levels of government”.87  
As the Court in Kitkatla noted, “provincial laws can apply to 
aboriginal peoples; First Nations are not enclaves of federal power in a 
sea of provincial jurisdiction”.88 Even where provincial heads of power 
like education or healthcare can be shown to be section 35 rights, that 
should not preclude provinces from legislating, given the Court’s 
statement in Tsilhqot’in Nation that “provincial regulation of general 
application will apply to exercises of Aboriginal rights ... subject to the  
s. 35 infringement and justification framework”.89  
(c) The Federal Government is Using Section 91(24) to Perform 
Provincial Obligations 
Given that the provinces are able to operate legislative schemes of 
general application which may impact Indigenous peoples, Daniels does 
more than draw attention to the federal government’s practice of 
providing disparate levels of resources services to different Indigenous 
peoples. Daniels raises the question, why does the federal government 
run a parallel scheme of services including education and healthcare for 
any Indigenous peoples? 
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Beyond the general obligations in section 91(24), there is no explicit 
requirement for the federal government to provide education or 
healthcare to Aboriginal peoples or Indigenous peoples.90 The provision 
of education is included as a provincial power under section 93 of the 
Constitution Act, 1867. Similarly, provinces also have broad and 
extensive powers over the provision of healthcare.91  
Why then does the federal government provide provincial-type services 
to some Indigenous peoples? At one time, the federal government’s policy of 
providing provincial-level services was doubtlessly due to section 91(24) 
and the “watertight compartments”92 view of federalism. But the landscape 
of federalism has changed over the years as a result of a “strong pull of pith 
and substance, the aspect doctrine and, in recent years, a very restrained 
approach to concurrency and paramountcy issues”.93 
The federal government does not have an obligation to provide 
services like health care and education. Social services fall to the very 
heart of provincial powers; they are quintessentially local maters, often 
involving local property.  
Without the obligation to provide provincial-type services to 
Indigenous peoples, Daniels presents Canada with a dilemma: should the 
federal government expand the provincial-type services it offers to all 
Indigenous peoples at significant cost, or should it abandon its provision 
of provincial-level services and use funding instead for other issues 
which are more central to Indigenous rights and reconciliation?  
(d) Daniels Makes Clear the Provinces’ Obligations to Indigenous 
Peoples 
If section 91(24) does not compel the federal government to legislate 
and does not exclude the provinces from enacting legislation, why then 
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would provinces expect that Métis and non-status Indians should turn to the 
federal government for these services? Additionally, what constitutional 
reason compels the federal government to provide these services?  
The earlier suggestion that the provinces ‘won’ Daniels was 
misconstrued. Daniels suggests that Canadian provinces cannot hide 
behind section 91(24) as a basis for not providing equal services and care 
to all citizens of their respective provinces. Any views suggesting that 
the federal government is solely responsible for providing what would 
otherwise be provincial services is inconsistent with the growing 
jurisprudence regarding provincial and federal rights and obligations 
towards Aboriginal and Indigenous peoples. 
Beyond its constitutional foundation, the Court’s approach also has 
immensely practical value. Provinces are best placed to provide local 
services like education and healthcare since, in many places, they 
provide them locally already, are more sensitive to local markets and 
needs, and as a result of their close proximity, may be more likely to 
respond to local concerns and developments. In many instances, the 
federal government’s continuing involvement in these local matters risks 
increasing local disparity between Indigenous peoples and Canadians. 
(e) A Framework for Reconciliation 
Although not expressly stated, it appears that the Court is setting up a 
system whereby the federal government can deal with broader matters 
associated with reconciliation with Indigenous peoples, but without 
interfering with provincial authority and responsibility for their citizens, 
including those who are Indigenous. Of course, the anomaly to this 
practical approach is the reality of the federal Indian Act and the 
provision of what normally would be provincial services (e.g., health 
care, education) to First Nations and reserve-based governments. The 
stage may be set for a much-needed dialogue as among the federal 
government, the provinces and Indigenous peoples about which level of 
government should be providing core services and which level of 
government should be focused on broader objectives of redress and 
reconciliation with Indigenous peoples in Canada.  
The Court has laid out a pathway to reconciliation in Kitkatla, Grassy 
Narrows and Tsilhqot’in Nation, among others, which increasingly sees 
Canadian provinces acting within their full capacity, constrained not by 
section 91(24), but instead by the rights and principles founded on 
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section 35. Despite suggestions that more money will need to be spent on 
Indigenous peoples following Daniels,94 the actual result could be the 
opposite. From a practical perspective, the federal government may be 
reticent to dramatically expand spending on Indigenous peoples, 
especially when the full number of potentially eligible persons remains 
unknown. Even without the evolution in federalism, existing funding 
would most likely be reallocated from First Nations and Inuit peoples to 
Métis and other Indigenous peoples.  
The emphasis on reconciliation and redress within Daniels illuminates 
the core of the federal government’s obligation towards Aboriginal and 
Indigenous peoples. Reconciliation involves negotiating treaties, and 
ensuring compliance thereunder. For Indigenous peoples living on reserves, 
reconciliation means developing structures that allow reserve communities 
to exercise their Aboriginal and treaty rights and protect the interests of 
future generations. For Indigenous peoples generally, reconciliation means 
providing redress for the historic misdeeds that Canada has committed 
against them as a result of their affiliation with, or identification as, 
Indigenous peoples and looking forward to ensure Indigenous peoples’ 
interests and those of Canada more generally are properly reconciled.  
II. CONCLUSION 
Daniels may end up being one of the most important Aboriginal law 
decisions, not because of the declaration that the Court makes, or those 
that it chose not to, but because of the insights it provides into the 
understanding of reconciliation. Reconciliation goes beyond just 
protecting section 35 rights. It also includes a larger concept of redress 
for those mistreated as a consequence of being Indigenous peoples. 
Many historic practices of the federal government are not consistent with 
section 35 or section 91(24) and are unnecessary, and potentially 
incompatible, with reconciliation.  
Daniels lays bare the unfounded historical legacy of the federal 
government’s approach to providing essentially local services to a 
discrete group of Canadians: status Indian and Inuit peoples. Federalism 
and section 91(24) have evolved and developed towards the all-
encompassing objective of reconciliation. Indigenous peoples are no 
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longer an ‘enclave’ of the federal government. They are Canadians and 
provincial residents. The rights of Aboriginal peoples do not come from 
inclusion under section 91(24), or from inclusion under the Indian Act, 
but rather are based on section 35, and are, as stated in Tsilqhot’in 
Nation, “a limit on both federal and provincial jurisdiction”.95  
Daniels stands as more evidence that federalism has evolved: it 
includes both the federal and provincial governments working within 
their constitutionally mandated powers to respect, and where permitted 
infringe, section 35 rights. In light of this evolution, Daniels could be the 
slight noise that triggers an avalanche of change, clearing away the 
historic practices and confines of the Indian Act in favour of a fresh, 
broad and simpler approach focused on reconciliation.  
As such, Daniels may represent the ultimate opportunity for Canada 
as a nation to recalibrate its relationship with Indigenous peoples and 
ensure that all levels of government are undertaking their appropriate 
roles to ensure that Indigenous Canadians are treated fairly and equitably, 
as are other Canadians, by both provincial governments and the federal 
government. Obviously, this is a significant challenge, but one that needs 
to be addressed head-on if the ultimate objective of reconciliation is to  
be achieved. 
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